Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Business Faculty Articles and Research

Business

2006

Outsourcing Central Banking: Lessons from Estonia
Sarkis Joseph Khoury
University of California - Riverside

Clas Wihlborg
Chapman University, wihlborg@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the International Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Khoury, S.J., & Wihlborg, C. (2006). Outsourcing central banking: Lessons from Estonia. Journal of Policy
Reform, 9(2): 125-144. doi: 10.1080/13841280600772051

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business at Chapman University Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Business Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of
Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Outsourcing Central Banking: Lessons from Estonia
Comments
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Journal of Policy Reform, volume 9, issue 2, in
2006, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13841280600772051.

Copyright
Taylor & Francis

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/
business_articles/48

OUTSOURCING CENTRAL BANKING:
THE CASES OF ESTONIA, AND ARGENTINA

Sarkis Joseph Khoury
University of California-Riverside
and

Clas Wihlborg
Copenhagen Business School

With Contributions by
Mart Sorg
University of Tartu
Vello Vensel
Tallinn Technical University

In memory of Vello Vensel, 1941-2004

Abstract.
The functions of a central bank have traditionally involved the setting of exchange rates and interest rates,
as well as a strong supervisory role by the central bank over the banking sector. The Currency Board
arrangement: orthodox or Estonian or Argentinian style, has rendered the central banking function
redundant in terms of interest rate and exchange rate determination. Foreign direct investment, when
substantially targeted to the banking sector, and supported by the local authorities can serve as an effective
substitute for the supervisory function of the indigenous central bank. This possible outsourcing of the
essential functions of the central bank leaves it with functions limited to the management of the foreign
exchange portfolio, data collection, moral suasion, and other minor functions. This eliminates local
political intervention if the appropriate legal and legislative frameworks are established, and if the
independence of the Central Bank and the permanency of the Currency Board arrangement are absolutely
committed to, independent of political currents and ideology. These are big ifs, however. We illustrate the
conditions for outsourcing reviewing the Estonian and the Argentinian experiences with Currency Boards
and banking crises. These experiences serve as legitimate cases for supporting the outsourcing of central
banking functions despite the rough roads traveled by their economies and their commercial banks.

Key words: Currency Board, Foreign Banks, Supervision, Regional Integration

I. Introduction
A currency board (CB) arrangement for balance of payments and money supply
adjustment is effectively an institution for the “outsourcing” of monetary policy by a
central bank. A number of European emerging market economies have established CBs
after the withdrawal of the iron curtain 1. The main argument for a CB arrangement is that
– if properly handled – it establishes credibility of a low inflation policy rapidly within a
country with weak political institutions and, accordingly, where trust in pronounced
economic policy objectives is lacking.

Monetary policy is one area of central bank responsibility. A second important area is
banking supervision. Although this function in some countries is the responsibility of a
separate financial supervisory authority (FSA) we will consider it one aspect of central
banking in this paper. We ask whether both functions of central banks can be outsourced
and under what conditions outsourcing is appropriate.

We review the experiences of two CB countries – Estonia and Argentina – in order to
identify factors that contribute to the success or failure of the outsourcing of monetary
policy and banking supervision. The CB arrangement implies in itself a high degree of
outsourcing of monetary policy while outsourcing of the supervisory role of the central
banks depends on an important presence of foreign owned banks as well as on the
organization of the banks and the supervisors. The CB arrangement influences banking
supervision indirectly through the constraints the CB puts on bailouts of banks. In this
setting we ask whether the principles favoring outsourcing of monetary policy applies to
bank supervision as well.

Outsourcing of important economic policy tools to a neighbouring, well established
country with a strong tradition of economic management contributes to the regional
1

Argentina, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, Estonia and Lithuania at present maintain such a
monetary system.
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integration of institutions for economic policy. The EU has inspired debate and calls for
regional integration in other parts of the world, Asia in particular. Outsourcing of policy
in the sense discussed here is a special form of regional integration in that institutions in
another country substitute for domestic institutions. The principles we discuss apply as
well to cases where regional integration is manifested through multinational institutions.
In both cases, national sovereignty in an important policy area is relinquished.

Our choice of countries to examine - Estonia and Argentina - is based on the general
observation of Estonia as the success case among CB countries, while Argentina’s CB is
commonly viewed as a case of failure. Both countries have banking systems dominated
by foreign-controlled banks, and are, consequently, better candidates for outsourcing.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the foundations of CB
structures, the potential benefits of outsourcing of central banking, and the institutional
set-up that would lead to almost complete outsourcing of both monetary and supervisory
authority. Section III discusses how and why outsourcing generally is partial. The
considerations here are both economical and political. Section IV turns to Estonia, a
country with strong outsourcing of monetary authority and an almost completely foreign
controlled banking system, but the banking supervisor has retained substantial
supervisory powers. Argentina, discussed in Section V, went from a relatively strong CB
arrangement to a severe currency and banking crisis in 2001. The banking system is not
dominated by foreign banks to the extent it is in Estonia. We argue that the “rules of the
game” of a currency board were not followed in Argentina and by being a more closed
and less liberal economy the conditions for outsourcing of central banking were not met.
We draw conclusions with respect to advantages and disadvantages of central bank
outsourcing in Section VI. Finally, in the concluding Section VII, we summarize the
discussion and draw implications for issues of regional integration.

3

II. The institutional set-up for outsourcing of monetary and supervisory authority

A number of countries have established currency boards (CB) in recent years. Argentina,
Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, Estonia and Lithuania at present maintain such a
monetary system. The IMF staff has discussed the introduction of currency board
arrangements with post-conflict Somalia and Liberia. The pros and cons of a currency
board for Russia have been also discussed. In some cases a currency board arrangement
has been a major element of a stabilisation programme (Currency Board Arrangements,
1997, p.54). In Estonia, a stable currency based on a CB-arrangement was the
cornerstone of the successful program for economic reforms.

Currency boards are not a new phenomenon in economics. The CB-principle was
established in the Bank Charter Act of 1844, where the Issue Department of the Bank of
England acted as a CB. For this reason, many of the British colonies in Africa, Asia and
the Caribbean used CBs on introduction of their own currencies. The first CB was
established in Mauritius in 1849. More than 70 such boards operated at one time. Among
the best known examples of territories which still have a CB of some kind are HongKong and Argentina. There is also a large literature for the experiences with currency
boards in various countries (see Kwan and Lui, 1996; Camard, 1996; Balino and Enoch,
1997; Perry, 1997; Enoch and Gulde, 1997; Eichengreen et al., 1998; Ghosh et al, 1998;
Schuler, 1998; Dobrev, 1999; Avramov, 1999; Korhonen, 1996 and 1999; Gulde, 1999;
Backe, 1999; Dubauskas et al 1999, Gulde, Kähkönen and Keller, 2000 etc.).
A CB is equivalent to a country specific gold standard. The exchange rate is fixed.
Under a gold standard the monetary base depends on the size of the gold reserves, and the
interest rate is determined by the forces of supply and demand with no interference from
the Central bank or any other government agency. The expansion in the monetary base
would depend on the increase in gold reserves and on the ratio between the unit of
currency and the unit of gold. This ratio is typically fixed absolutely. Substitutuing a
strong convertible currency (an anchor currency) such as the dollar or the euro for gold,
and the cornerstone of the Currency Board is obtained. The home currency is fully
convertible to the anchor currency at a fixed rate and on demand.

4

An orthodox CB is a monetary authority that does not have to be the Central Bank, nor
housed in it or even in its country. Kurt Schuler (1996) argued that an orthodox
arrangement involves the following:
‘ A typical, orthodox currency board holds foreign reserves, such as
foreign bonds, equal to 100 percent of its liabilities (or in some historical cases up to
115%), as set by law. It has no ability to conduct open market operations , establish
required reserve ratios for commercial banks, or engage in other discretionary monetary
policies.’

The orthodox CB is not subordinated to a central bank but only backs bank notes with
foreign assets. Therefore, some observers do not consider present-day CB arrangements
to be “real” currency boards (Hanke, Jonung, Schuler, 1993a, p. 12). The aim of any CB
system is to achieve currency convertibility and a fixed exchange rate, and thereby help
to stabilise the economy, bring about structural change and integrate the country into the
world economy as quickly as possible

The Estonian CB was not orthodox, although very close. The Bank of Estonia (BOE)
relied on a classical CB model where it is prohibited by law from devaluing the Kroon or
financing any government debt. The Kroon was fully secured by gold and DM reserves.
BOE used reserve requirements, prudential measures, loans to banks in distress in rather
restrictive fashion.
Under the Estonian CB, like any other CB with considerable orthodoxy, the Monetary
authority sets the exchange rate and monetary policy is on automatic pilot. As official
foreign exchange reserves increase, so will the monetary base. There is, consequently, no
conflict between exchange rates and monetary policy.

The remaining functions of the central bank--bank supervision, currency management
activity, settlement system, statistical compilation, etc.-- justify the continuing existence
of the central bank. However, we shall argue below that significant foreign direct
investment in the banking sector makes the domestic supervisory function redundant
diminishing in the process the need to maintain a central bank.
5

Any fixed exchange rate system implies a degree of outsourcing of control over
monetary conditions in a country. The degree of outsourcing depends on the intended
time horizon of the fixed rate, the credibility of the rate, the degree of capital mobility,
and the share in GDP of international trade. These factors are well known and they will
not be discussed at length. The most complete outsourcing is membership of a currency
area with one central bank as in the EU. An orthodox currency board comes close. Under
such an arrangement there is a one-to-one correspondence between foreign exchange
reserves and the money supply.

CBs in practice have a number of “wedges” between the money supply and foreign
exchange reserves and these wedges are subject to some discretionary authority by
domestic policy authorities. For example, in a fractional reserve banking system, reserve
requirements can be used to influence monetary conditions. The strong linkage between
foreign exchange reserves and the monetary base can be broken by the issuing of
securities by the central bank. A prohibition on lending to fiscal authorities and on open
market operations in government securities may be subject to parliamentary authority
and, therefore, not always credible.

Other fixed exchange rate arrangements provide the central bank with the authority to
conduct open market operations to control the money supply and influence interest rates.
The time horizon over which the central bank has the ability to determine the money
supply depends on the degree of capital mobility. Under perfect capital mobility the
central bank loses all independent monetary control. The CB arrangement provides an
institutional setting for relinquishing monetary control at any degree of capital mobility.
As noted, the credibility of the CB arrangement requires institutional support to prevent
the monetary authority from influencing the money supply by means of various actions in
the financial markets. 2

2

Sweeney (1999) discusses factors that influence the credibility of a CB arrangement.
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The implications of the CB system on the banking system are very important to analyze,
as the burden of performance shifts onto the banking sector. Meeting that challenge
requires strong human capital, good and honest leadership, and solid strategies within the
banking domain.
Under the CB the banking system has to react efficiently, effectively, and creatively to
changing capital flows that are occasionally massive. Banks, by necessity have to
become international banks in order to respond to changes in their environment dictated
largely by international factors.

Turning to outsourcing of banking supervision it is in principle possible for a country to
enter an arrangement with a foreign supervisory authority to take responsibility for the
supervision of domestic banks. We are not interested in this type of outsourcing here. If a
country lacks supervisory capability it is possible to buy (sub-contract) such capability in
order to supervise domestic banks. Instead we are concerned with the situation when the
banking system in a country is controlled to a large extent by foreign banks, as in many
emerging market economics. In Estonia more than 90 percent of bank assets are held by
Swedish and Finnish-owned banks. The situation is similar across Eastern and Central
Europe where on average 70 percent of bank assets are held by foreign controlled banks.
Is there a role for the domestic supervisor in this setting, especially when foreign owned
banks are themselves often subject to a proven, effective supervisory authority in the
home country?

Foreign control of a bank does not necessarily imply that it is supervised by the home
country supervisor. There is in general a division of responsibility between home and
host country supervisors. This division may be more or less formalized in memoranda of
understanding. Formally, if a bank is incorporated in a country as a subsidiary of a
foreign bank, the host country has the legal means to supervise and set rules to the extent
it wishes. The subsidiary form of organization of foreign direct investments in the
banking sector is by far the dominant organization. A bank considering foreign expansion
may set up a representative office as a first step into the host country, but if the host
country operations are to become full-fledged operations, the bank must choose either the
7

branch or the subsidiary form of organization. Host countries generally require that
foreign banks establish subsidiaries if they have more than a marginal market share. A
branch does not have its own capital base, and assets and liabilities are part of a bank
beyond the host country supervisor’s control. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the
supervisor and other authorities to remain informed about the soundness of total banking
operations, and even to control whether the bank branches abide by country-specific
banking rules. We must note, however, that the home country authorities are responsible
for supervising the worldwide exposure and asset risk profile of their home chartered
banks no matter the ownership structure abroad.

The complete outsourcing of banking supervision requires that host countries allow
foreign banks to choose the branch organization even in cases when the foreign banks
have large market shares. Furthermore, the foreign branches must have a dominant
market share for the outsourcing to refer to the banking system rather than an individual
bank. As long as foreign banks have subsidiaries, the outsourcing of supervision is bound
to be incomplete since a subsidiary is a legal entity in the host country with its own
capital base.

Deposit insurance schemes play an important role in banking. Does outsourcing of
supervision of foreign banks require deposit insurance to be the responsibility of the
home country? The European Union’s deposit insurance regulation seems to be based on
this assumption, since it places the responsibility for deposit insurance on the home
countries of banks in the EU. In the US, on the other hand, foreign banks serving
American customers must join the American deposit insurance system (the FDIC).

In our view the complete outsourcing of supervision requires that the insurance of host
country depositors is the responsibility of the home country, as the EU deposit insurance
directive stipulates. To the extent the host country runs the deposit insurance system, it
has a financial stake in the safety and soundness of the bank. The financial stake implies
that there is a strong incentive to supervise either the bank or the home country

8

supervisor. Having faith in the ability of the home country supervisor may not be
sufficient when the government has a direct financial stake in the soundness of the banks.

In the next section we discuss why outsourcing of supervision may not always be
politically feasible, but it can be noted here that allowing the banking system to be
supervised by foreign supervisors, and the deposit insurance system to be a foreign
responsibility requires a great deal of trust in the ability and honesty of the foreign
supervisors, including trust in crisis management capabilities, as well as trust in the
sufficiency of their deposit insurance system.

The issue of trust in the capabilities and honesty of foreign policy authorities is relevant
for the CB arrangement as well. The CB implies that monetary conditions, and hence
inflation, are under the control of a foreign central bank. Furthermore, under a CB
arrangement, the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) role of the central bank is relinquished.
Thus, foreign banks’ subsidiaries in the CB country do not have a LOLR, while foreign
banks’ branches have one in the central bank of the home country. In this sense there is
consistency between a CB arrangement and foreign banks operating through branches.

III. Economics and Politics of Central Bank Outsourcing
The main economic benefits and costs of a CB system are well-known from the Optimum
Currency Area (OCA) literature 3. There are potential costs of relinquishing mechanisms
for macroeconomic adjustment. Exchange rate and monetary policies are given up as
policy instruments. The benefits follow if a country faces substantial costs of gaining
credibility for policies aimed at a stable price level. Possible benefits and costs in terms
of national pride will be neglected here, albeit they can be powerful bases for economic
decision making.

The benefits and costs of outsourcing banking supervision are perhaps more complex and
controversial. The main benefits of foreign direct investments in banking in emerging
market economies is that expertise in information systems, risk-evaluation systems, and
3

See, for example, Wihlborg and Willett (1992) for a review.
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bank management can be made available to the domestic banking system very rapidly. In
subsidiaries or in branches, this expertise can be combined with local market knowledge
to transform a banking structure 4.

Outsourcing of the supervisory function similarly implies that expertise, credibility and
impartiality of high quality supervision can be obtained quickly. It can possibly be argued
that the foreign supervisor is insufficiently informed about local market conditions but
one expects that such expertise will be hired, if the supervisor’s incentives to understand
host country conditions are present.

There are a number of factors that could make the host country worried about relying on
a foreign banking supervisor for important parts of the banking system. First, in the case
of a subsidiary organization, the foreign bank could simply abandon the host country if
credit losses mount 5. Worse, the bank foreseeing the abandonment of a country could
shift bad loans from other countries to the bank, leaving host country depositors or tax
payers even worse off. Making matters even worse, the home country supervisor of the
foreign bank has the incentive to collude with the bank in the shifting of risky and bad
loans to the host country subsidiary in order to reduce the risk of home country depositors
and tax payers 6. For these reasons, it can be risky for a country to outsource banking
supervision completely as long as foreign banks are established as subsidiaries.

Turning to the situation when the foreign bank has established branches in the host
country, it would seem that the above risk-shifting argument is weaker or non-existent,
because all branches are buffered by the same capital base 7. A weak bank would want to
keep branches that contribute the most to profitability wherever they are located. This
profitability may arise as a result of national subsidization of banks in distress in the host

4

See Lensink (2004) for a discussion of benefits. The subsidiary organization may have one initial
advantage in that the host country subsidiary more easily can be identified as a local bank under local
management (Kowalski et al., 2004).
5
Westdeutsche Landesbank abandoned Croatia quite suddenly in 2002.
6
See European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No. 17, 2003.
7
The discussion here is base don Goldberg, Sweeney and Wihlborg (2005).
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country. In such a case the distressed bank as well as the home country supervisor have
an incentive to tap into the subsidy scheme.

One form of subsidization occurs through deposit insurance systems. If the responsibility
for deposit insurance belongs to the host country (as in the USA), the home country
supervisor bears less responsibility for depositors and the home country tax payers than is
the case when the home country is responsible for the deposit insurance system for all
depositors in the bank. The home country supervisor may be more risk tolerant when
deposit insurance is the responsibility of each host county. Whether these considerations
need to be of concern for host countries would depend on the size of banking operations
in different countries. The bank may be of systemic importance in the host country, but
not in the home country, or vice versa. Clearly, it is the former case that should be of
concern for the host country. The home country risk tolerance problem would not be
present if the home country bears the total deposit insurance responsibility.

So far it would seem that branch banking in host countries with deposit insurance
responsibility assigned to the home country provides the appropriate incentives for
outsourcing of banking supervision. The appropriate incentives of the home country
supervisor comprise only one aspect of the outsourcing, however.

Another aspect is crisis management. Is there a risk that the home country supervisor
resolves a banking crisis without proper concern for the interests of host countries with
branches? We argued above that the home country supervisor may collude with the bank
in shifting bad loans to the subsidiary facing distress. In the case of branch banking, this
problem does not arise since all bad loans must be buffered by the same capital base and
deposit insurance systems. Nonetheless, in the process of resolving the banking crisis the
supervisor in the home country may try to salvage as much as possible of home country
operations at the expense of operations in foreign branches. For example, assets in the
foreign branches may be transferred to the home country before closing down host
country operations. The foreign depositors still have their claims on the bank but these
claims may be harder to enforce if the host country branch has been closed down. Thus,
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the host country must be careful with its choice of outsourcing partner and make sure that
its depositors have the same legal standing as the home country depositors in a banking
crisis.

A second problem that may arise for the host country occurs if the branches constitute a
large share of the banking system. The distress of the foreign-controlled bank could cause
a systemic problem in the host country. Thus, the host country needs to be convinced that
the home country has a non-discriminatory and effective resolution mechanism in place.

These considerations imply that trust in the ability of a foreign country’s supervisor and
legal system to resolve a banking crisis rapidly and in a non-discriminatory way is a
precondition for successful outsourcing of banking supervision. If the host country
operations are organized in subsidiaries, outsourcing requires even greater trust because
there are, as noted, incentives for the home country bank and its supervisor to shift bad
loans to the subsidiaries when the subsidiary is near or in distress. In the next section we
will see how two countries retained supervisory capability for subsidiaries of foreign
banks along with domestically controlled banks.
IV. Central Banking Reforms in Estonia: Establishing Credibility in a Transition
Economy 8
In this section we review the monetary and banking system experiences of Estonia during
a CB period from the early 90s. Estonia is generally considered a highly successful
transition country. In the next section we turn to Argentina. Both countries have had a
substantial or growing presence of foreign banks during the period. We begin by
reviewing the historical developments in Estonia during the transition before turning to
an evaluation of policies in light of our discussion of costs and benefits of outsourcing of
central bank functions.

IV.1 Currency board and banking reforms in Estonia during the 1990s

8

This section is based on Sorg and Vensel (1999) and Sorg (2000)
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In August 1991 the three Baltic States regained their independence from the USSR, and
Estonia was the first to introduce its own currency - the Estonian kroon (EEK) - in June
1992. The idea that Estonia should have its own currency dates from September 1987,
when four Estonian social scientists put forward a proposal for Estonian economic
autonomy. The supporters of the idea of a national monetary system hoped to achieve
three main objectives: (1) eliminate inflationary influences from the East, (2) establish
approximate macroeconomic balance of supply and demand, and (3) eliminate persistent
cash crises.

Hyperinflation had broken out due to the liberalisation of prices and the disruption of
Estonia’s eastern trade at the beginning of 1992. The consumer price index rose by 87%
in January 1992, 74% in February and 30% in March in comparison with the previous
month. This caused severe cash crises and threatened to paralyse money circulation
completely. The Bank of Estonia (BOE) and the Estonian Savings Bank issued cheque
books (a major innovation) to alleviate the shortage of cash but the population used them
rather reluctantly. The public sector was instructed to pay wages four times a month,
instead of twice as they did previously, and a ceiling on cash payments was fixed at 1000
roubles. Permission was given to use foreign currency alongside the rouble in buying and
selling goods and services. Confidence in the inflationary rouble, also called the
“occupation rouble”, was lost completely. Various means of payment started to emerge
spontaneously in enterprises, which were used for shopping. One manifestation was a
higher dollarization ratio than elsewhere in the Baltic States. Before Estonia’s currency
reform in the second quarter 1992 the dollarization ratio peaked around 60 percent in
Estonia, 50 percent in Lithuania (first quarter 1993), and 35 percent in Latvia (first
quarter 1993) (see Sahay and Végh, 1995, p. 37).

The Estonian authorities considered two conditions for a successful currency reform: (1)
The currency reform must be carried out as quickly as possible before multiple wage and
inflation shocks could cause a social explosion and economic collapse, and (2) the new
currency had to inspire confidence large enough to dislodge the dollar. This had to be
done under circumstances of deep economic crisis and lack of experience by the central

13

bank in carrying out monetary policy. As a first step, inflation had to be controlled.
Exchange rate stability was to be used as a conduit to price stability. The exchange rate
between the kroon and DEM was set at 8 EEK = 1 DEM. The kroon was initially
undervalued 75-80 percent relative to a purchasing power parity ratio. The
undervaluation caused some inflationary pressure on consumer prices. However, the
inflation rate in Estonia declined continuously (Exhibit 1) and in 1998 the CPI increase
had reached a level lower than 10%. It was below 5% in 1999 9. Thereafter, inflation has
remained low and on level with the EMU.

The Estonian CB was clearly not orthodox, although very close. The Bank of Estonia
(BOE) relied on a classical CB model where it is prohibited by law from devaluing the
Kroon or financing any government debt. The Kroon was fully secured by gold and DM
(now Euro) reserves. The BOE uses reserve requirements, prudential measures, loans to
banks in distress under restricted conditions (without acting as a lender of last resort), and

Exhibit 1
Inflation against the Previous Year (%)
1992
1993
Increase in consumer prices 1076.5 89.8
(CPI)
open sector
991.6 84.9
Sheltered sector
1702.7 149.3
Increase in producer prices
… 99.9
(PPI)
Increase in export prices
…
…
Increase in import prices
…
…
Increase in construction
prices
Increase in real effective
exchange rate (REER) index
…
…
(Source: Bank of Estonia)
9

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
47.7 29.0 23.1 11.2
8.2
3.3
33.8
89.1
36.3

17.4
47.9
25.6

18.6
28.6
14.8

7.8
15.8
8.8

6.0
13.6
4.2

0.3
10.1
-1.2

…
…
…

15.2
…
36.0

11.4
…
18.7

7.5
…
10.1

2.1
…
7.7

-0.4
0.4
2.0

10.9

18.0

9.7

3.3

10.4

7.3

Dubauskas, Wihlborg and Willett (1999) review the path to credibility of the Estonian CB and the central
banks of Latvia and Lithuania.
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forbearance when banks get into some difficulties to manage the money supply and the
banking system. Exhibit 2 shows the developments in reserve requirements. The reserve
ratio was changed only once during the life of the Estonian CB. A 3% additional reserve
requirement was added in late 1997 to the existing 10% ratio. The most significant
development, however, was the decision to pay interest on reserve requirements in July
1999. This effectively eliminated the need of the BOE to issue interest bearing
instruments that can be purchased by the commercial banks and have them count as
reserves.

In order to allow the currency board to operate with credibility, it was deemed necessary
to safeguard the independence of the BOE, while regulating its detailed functions as a
CB. The credibility of the CB operations of the Bank of Estonia was and is guaranteed by
the following stipulations: it is not allowed to extend credit to the government, its assets
are kept separate from the state budget and its managerial staff is appointed by Estonia’s
president and parliament. The BOE was instructed that the exchange rate of the kroon
could be fixed (or pegged) nominally to the Deutsche mark (1DEM = 8EEK). Only
parliament can change this nominal anchor, though the BOE can permit fluctuations of
the pegged rate within margins of 3 per cent.

The CB system has potentially important implications for the banking system for several
reasons; One, the CB arrangement prevents the monetary authority from acting as a
Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). Second, the CB imposes a degree of fiscal discipline
because the government cannot borrow from the central bank. Third, by not being able to
support banks in crisis by means of LOLR lending, the fiscal implications of aid to banks
become relatively transparent. Fourth, since capital flows are occasionally massive, banks
have to become international banks in order to respond to capital flows in the
international environment. All these factors seem to have played a role in the
development of the Estonian banking system during the transition process.

15

From the first days of the CB system the Estonian commercial banks had to grow fast,
learn even faster, and allow for a high level of flexibility in their operations and in their
portfolios. These are not the hallmarks of emerging banking institutions. The
overwhelming number of Estonian banks were not in a position to perform, primarily
because of lack of experience and expertise. Banks were often misled by their central
Exhibit 2
Reserve Requirements in Estonia 1995-1999
1) reserve requirement
base

1995
Liabilities to
customers
Since monetary
reform

2) monthly minimum
reserve requirement

3) cash component in
monthly minimum
reserve requirement
4) averaging

5) daily minimum
reserve requirement

6) penalty interest rate
for non-compliance with
the reserve requirement
(annual interest rate)
7)remuneration of
reserve requirement
Since 1 July 1999

1) additional liquidity
requirement
2) penalty for noncompliance with
additional liquidity
requirement
3) remuneration for
compliance with
liquidity requirement

4.- Interest paid on
excess reserves
Since 1 July 1996

10% of the
reserve
requirement
base. Since 1
January, 1993
50%
Since 7 July,
1994
Non-averaged
Since monetary
reform
Same as
monthly
minimum
reserve
requirement (see
2.2)
Since 1 January,
1993
15%/25%1
Since 30
December, 1993

-

1996
a) Liabilities to
customers;
b) debt
securities issued
by banks
Since 1 July
1996

1997
a) Liabilities to customers;
b) debt securities issued by
banks;
c) net liabilities to foreign
credit institutions
Since 1 July 1997

10% of the reserve
requirement base.

1998
a) Liabilities to customers;
b) debt securities issued by
banks;
c) net liabilities to foreign
credit institutions
d) financial quarantees to
institutions and non-resident
credit institutions.
Since 1 September 19983
10% of the reserve
requirement base.

1999
a) Liabilities to customers;
b) debt securities issued by
banks;
c) net liabilities to foreign credit
institutions
d) financial quarantees to
institutions and non-resident
credit institutions.
Since 1 September 19983
10% of the reserve requirement
base.

10% of the
reserve
requirement
base.
40%
Since 1 July
1996
Averaged on
monthly basis
Since 1 July
1996
2% of the
reserve
requirement
base
Since 1 July
1996

30%
Since 1 July 1997

20%
Since 19 June, 1998

10% of the reserve requirement
base

Averaged on monthly basis

Averaged on monthly basis

Averaged on monthly basis

4% of the reserve
requirement base
Since 1 November 1997

4% of the reserve requirement
base

4% of the reserve requirement
base

15%
Since 1 July
1996

20%
Since 1 November 1997

20%

20%

-

-

-

European Central Bank’s deposit
interest rate
Since 1 July 1999

-

-

-

-

-

-

0%
Since monetary
reform

Deutsche
Bundesbank’s
discount rate
minus 1%
Since 1 July
1996

3.- Additional liquidity requirement
Since 1 November 1997
3% of the reserve
3% of the reserve requirement
requirement base2.
base
Higher reserve requirement
Higher reserve requirement or
or other sanctions
other sanctions

Deutsche Bundesbank’s
discount rate
Since 1 November 1997

Deutsche Bundesbank’s
discount rate
Since 1 November 1997
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Deutsche Bundesbank’s
discount rate
Since 1 November 1997
European Central Bank’s
deposit interest rate
Since 1 January 1999
Deutsche Bundesbank’s
discount rate
Since 1 November 1997
European Central Bank’s
deposit interest rate
Since 1 January 1999

3% of the reserve requirement
base
Higher reserve requirement or
other sanctions

Deutsche Bundesbank’s discount
rate
Since 1 November 1997
European Central Bank’s deposit
interest rate
Since 1 January 1999
Deutsche Bundesbank’s discount
rate
Since 1 November 1997
European Central Bank’s deposit
interest rate
Since 1 January 1999

bank that authorized activities that were not traditional banking activities and that
required more skills than was available. The result was massive failure of banks in
Estonia. The industry shrank from 42 banks in 1992 to 11 by the end of 1997 and to 6 by
the end of 1999. The share of the public sector in the capitalization of the banking sector
fell to 4% in 1997 and to almost nothing in 1999.

The BOE as a central bank was re-established in January 1990. It developed its staff and
barely created the normative basis for performance and supervision of banking system
during the first years of operation. We must also remember that the CB reform took place
in June 1992 and before the reform there was extremely low trust in the inflationary
Soviet rouble. Banks earned profits from currency trading. They dealt with traditional
banking business on a limited basis. After the currency reform such opportunities to earn
profits were reduced significantly and some of the banks were not able to survive the
shock caused by the changes in the earnings’ structure.

Hyperinflation had reduced the real value of the required initial equity capital of banks
several times. A boom in establishing new private commercial banks then occurred in
Estonia in the first half-year of 1992 when 21 new banks were granted a banking license.
By the end of 1992 the total number of banks was 42. These banks were relatively small
with respect both to assets and number of shareholders. As a result of the Estonian
banking crises in 1992-1994 the number of commercial banks was cut by more than one
half due to bankruptcies and mergers.

The central bank acted quite quickly and actively to get over the banking crises. The BOE
added stronger prudential measures to its operations in reflecting international standards.
Beginning on January 1, 1993, these prudential requirements included: minimum equity
requirement (5 million kroons), capital adequacy ratio (8%), liquidity ratio (10%), reserve
requirements (10% from deposits), etc. These measures were probably inspired by the
first Basel agreement. In April 1993, the Bank of Estonia announced a stabilisation
period for the banking system. The issuance of new banking licences was frozen.
Existing banks had to meet a schedule for a gradual rise in minimum equity capital up to
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5 million ECU. After that, the Bank of Estonia did not renew licenses of 8 banks. Ten
banks merged into one bigger bank (Union Bank of Estonia), to three banks declared a
moratorium. As a result, 21 commercial banks were operating at the end of 1993.

The BOE managed to avert a disaster: “The characteristic feature of the first banking
crises in Estonia was that it was caused by internal reasons and it was overcome with
Estonia’s own resources and management skills” (Sorg, 2000, p. 403). The main causes
of this banking crises were deep slump of the whole economy, poor bank management
and lack of professional skills, as well as weak supervision both from the central bank
and from the owners. The depositors’ losses in the banking crises were large, money
supply decreased. Many loans had to be written down. As a result, the trustworthiness of
the banking system dropped significantly, but the system was cleansing itself.

Confidence in the banking system began to increase when bankers started to pay more
attention to the risk management and analysis, and pay more attention to the quality and
the profitability of banking services. Foreign banks took great interest in Estonia. Finnish
banks opened their representative offices in Estonia. At the same time, problems arose in
connection with the operations of the largest commercial bank (Social Bank of Estonia)
in 1994. This poorly run bank was liquidated in March, 1995.

By 1995, the Estonian banking sector achieved respectable standards. Competition
tightened further in the banking market, banks introduced new banking services and
products and they paid more attention to private clients’ needs. Svenska Handelsbanken,
Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein, Finnish Yhdispankki etc, opened their representative
offices in Estonia. The liquidation of Estonian Social Bank ended in March 1995. The
disappearance of this unprofessionally managed bank from the banking market had a
positive influence on the market. Due to rising equity requirements, banks started to look
for strategic investors and the merging process started. As a result, there were 18
commercial banks operating by the end of 1995.
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1996 was a year of expansion into new markets and developing more banking services.
Estonian banks expanded their activities outside Estonia: some banks opened their
representative offices in Russia and Hansabank opened a subsidiary in Latvia. The
banking sector started to provide other financial services (leasing, insurance, brokerage
services). The opening of the Tallinn Stock Exchange on 1 June 1996 was the most
important event for development the financial sector. The listed stocks consisted mostly
of bank shares. These remained the most actively traded securities until the beginning of
1999. Depositors also contributed to the changes in the banking sector. The share of cash
transactions diminished and the number of bank cards and ATM transactions grew
rapidly. Bigger banks started to provide telebanking and Internet banking services. At the
end of 1996 Estonia had 15 commercial banks and two loan and savings co-operatives.
During 1997, the Estonian banking sector underwent further consolidation. The rapidly
growing economy (growth of GDP 11.8%) boosted credit demand. Banking and nonbanking financial intermediation accelerated. A new stage in the development of the
Estonian banking market in the international context was reached. Standard & Poor
assigned Estonia investment grade credit rating BBB+ and Moody’s Investors Service
rated Estonia, Baa1, the highest credit rating of the previous Soviet Union countries. The
European rating agency IBCA assigned Estonia long-term credit rating of BBB and
short-term credit rating A3. Credit ratings were assigned also to individual banks. For
example, in 1997 Moody’s long-term credit rating of Hansabank and the Union Bank of
Estonia was Baa2. IBCA rated Union Bank of Estonia BBB.

Substantial changes took place in the Estonian banking sector in 1998 and 1999. The
Bank of Estonia adopted several radical measures to prevent possible instability in the
Estonian banking sector. Some banks were merged, and some bank bankruptcy
procedures were initiated. As a result of such consolidation process, the number of
commercial banks in the Estonian banking market fell to six.
The problems in the banking sector were first and foremost due to flawed financial and
management decisions made in an ever more competitive environment. The changed
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economic environment had a significant effect on the Estonian banking sector. Add to
this, the Russian crisis which had especially significant effects on smaller banks. The
largest Estonian banks merged: Estonian Savings Bank (market share 21%) merged with
Hansapank (market share 24%), and Bank of Tallinn (market share 7%) merged with the
Union Bank of Estonia (market share 26%). As a result, the interest of Scandinavian
banks in Estonian banks rose: Swedish Swedbank acquired 59% of the Hansapank, and
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken acquired 32% of the Union Bank of Estonia.

Since the year 2000 the commercial banks of Estonia are on their own more than ever..
The BOE will no longer, as it may have in the past, act as a lender of last resort
regardless of the size of the troubled banking institution. This stance may be irrelevant,
however, given the massive foreign ownership of the Estonian banking system. The
foreign banks are fully subject to the regulations of the home country and are
consequently beneficiaries of whatever the home country central bank allows. The BOE
treats foreign banks on a nondiscriminatory basis.

The share of foreign banks in the banking sector has increased dramatically as is shown
in Exhibit 3. Foreign banks invested massively encouraged by a very liberal FDI policy
in Estonia, and by extremely advantageous stock prices for target banks especially in the
wake of the Russian crisis in 1998. The net result is a banking industry in Estonia that is
primarily Estonian in location only. No one in Estonia we discussed this matter with
seems to be concerned with the ownership of the banking sector. Foreign ownership was
deemed necessary for a stable and profitable banking sector that enjoys public confidence
and support.
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Exhibit 3

Share of non-resident investors in Estonian banks' equity
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IV.2 Assessing the performance of the BOE and outsourcing in Estonia

To assess the performance of the BOE further we look at assessments by the OECD and
the IMF.

A study by the OECD on foreign direct investment in Estonia published in November
1999 concluded that FDI was long term in nature, driven by the stability of the Kroon, the
various guarantees offered by the Estonian government, attractive asset prices and the
low tax rate (flat 26% personal and corporate income tax rate). FDI had a very strong
positive impact on the Estonian economy. Skills increased markedly, production methods
were upgraded, R&D expenditures increased, and management attitudes and structures
changed considerably. In the banking sector, the changes were dramatic:
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‘In general…, foreign entry has been considered positive, as it has raised
corporate governance standards and quality control, as foreign banks were controlled by
their home country regulations, while local banks typically exhibit more reckless lending
practices. Foreign control can lower capital costs, facilitate compliance with capital
requirements, and reduce the collusion with local authorities. Furthermore, corporate
finance and banking services are now well established for the benefit of especially Nordic
foreign investors.’
This conclusion drawn by the OECD researchers that foreign direct investment has had
very stabilizing and confidence generating effects on the Estonian banking sector is fully
confirmed by an independent case study submitted to the Ministry of Finance and to the
Bank of Estonia in December, 1998 on the Eesti Maapank bankruptcy. 10 This bankruptcy
when coupled with falling values of bank shares dramatically illustrates why foreign
ownership became inevitable. The dirty linen of Estonia banking could not be washed in
private. Once in the open, the Swedes and Finns were watching. The report states the
following:
‘The reasons for the failure of Maapank are mainly due to (i) a high proportion of
non-performing loans, and (ii) a decline in the value of its securities portfolio in the wake
of the stock market decline in late 1997 and early 1998. Furthermore, it appears that the
actual size of non-performing loans is far greater than the reported figures, and that, with
respect to the securities portfolio, Maapank continued incorrectly to report the higher face
value of the securities instead of marking them to market – as required by the BOE – thus
inflating both its assets and profits. Although the banking Supervision Department (the
BSD) of the BOE noted this in early 1998, no action was taken until June……….We
found incompetent management to be the main reason for the bankruptcy…..Activities of
some people involved in managing the bank were with criminal intent…..the
management board of the bank lacked adequate overview of the activities….the bank
abused the possibility given by the Bank of Estonia to enter into sophisticated and
dangerous, somehow illegal transactions applying forward contracts, the so-called
Hansabank bonds, and let the managers make deals with themselves.’
It is clear that neither internal, nor external supervision of the bank was exercised
adequately. The net results were fully predictable. One must point out, however, based on
many discussions and interviews at the BOE, that the likelihood of another Maapank has
been dramatically reduced and that the current BOE staff has developed a considerable
level of sophistication in a rather brief period of time.

10

The BOE declared the Eesti Maapank bankrupt on June 28, 1998
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The BOE has a de minimus deposit insurance (covering only $3,000 currently). It has
been rather aggressive in the past in closing unprofitable banks with occasionally
substantial losses to depositors, and is preempted by the CB structure from ever acting as
lender of last resort, no matter the size of the bank under consideration. The emphasis is,
therefore, on prudential measures. The challenge is to be able to meet the core principles
of banking supervision as enunciated primarily by the Bank of International Settlement
(BIS). These principles have been accepted by all EU countries and the United States.
They constitute the standards that the BOE must aspire to meet as a new member of the
EU, as long as supervision is not outsourced completely.

A recent assessment by the IMF of the extent of Estonian compliance with the Basic core
principles completed in March 2000 is shown in Exhibit 4. Clearly, non-trivial hurdles
remain.

Exhibit 4
Estonia: Compliance with the Basel Core Principles
(Assessment of February/March 2000)
Core principle

C1

1(1) Objectives

X

1(2) Independence

LC2

MNC3

NC4

X

1(3) Legal framework

X

1(4) Enforcement powers

X

Supervisors need training.

1(5) Legal protection

X

1(6) Information sharing

Corrective Actions

X

Legal protection is lacking.
No Memorandum of Understanding with
Securities Inspectorate.

2. Permissible activities

X

3. Scope of licensing

X

4. Ownership

X

5. Investment criteria

X

6. Capital adequacy

X

7. Loan & Investment policy

X

8. Asset quality

X

X

Decree on loan classification and loan loss
provisioning to be issued by end of March
2000.

9. Large exposures

X
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10. Connected lending

X

Definition of connected parties should be
extended to managers of shareholds and to
companies in which managers hold a
qualifying interest.

11. Country risk

X

Capital adequacy regulations to cover these
risks to be issued by end of 2000.

12. Market risk

X

BOE should seek external support when
assessing risk models.

13. Other risks

X

Need explanations on operational risk.
Banks should establish information-sharing
system on fraud.

14. Internal controls

X

15. Money laundering

X

No provision for a Money Laundering
Prevention Act for information sharing with
other agencies.

16. On-site/off-site

X

supervision
17. Bank management

X

Managers of credit institutions should
inform BSD of any material changes in their
organization.

18. Off-site supervision

X

Reporting rules for loan classification await
decree by BOE on the subject.

19. Validation of information

X

On-site supervisors should have unlimited
access to the management and staff of the
supervised banks.

20. Consolidated supervision

X

BOE should have the authority to review
activities of parent companies and their
affiliates.

21. Accounting

X

22. Corrective action

X

23. Global consolidation

X

BOE should have the power to order closing
of the overseas branches of Estonian banks.

24. Host country supervision

X

MOUs with other country regulators are in
the final stages of execution.

25. Supervision of foreign

X

establishments

Source: Mission’s assessment
1/C: Compliant
2/LC: Largely compliant
3/MNC: Materially noncompliant
4/NC: Noncompliant
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The report by the IMF concluded the following:
‘The BOE was found to have a competent, professional, but somewhat
inexperienced supervisory staff…..Questions have arisen regarding the quality of some
audits…Even though the preconditions for effective banking supervision are met, several
weaknesses were identified. These include: a lack of adequate training arrangements for
supervisory staff for upgrading of skills to meet the demand for emerging products….A
greater concern is that the BSD has not issued a decree on minimum rules for loan
classification and loan loss provisioning…The BOE has not issued guidance on the
management of country and transfer risk.’
The same report found that the BOE was largely compliant with the transparency
requirements in monetary and financial policies.

In all cases the IMF report starts with the assumption that the existence of a domestic
Bank Supervision Department (BSD) is required, and that no other alternatives exist. This
may be the IMF model or one of the bureaucratic requirements of the EU. However, the
EU model states, as noted above, that the home country supervisor takes responsibility
for supervision as well as deposit insurance. In the case of branch banking, this principle
implies complete outsourcing of supervision. In the case of Estonia, foreign banks have
so far chosen to operate subsidiaries with the consequence that outsourcing has not been
complete.
Although the BIS-principles favor consolidated supervision, Estonia, as well as other
Eastern European countries, have retained substantial influence in the supervision in
cooperation with the home country supervisors. In fact, in Estonia, the local supervisor is
perceived by local managers of foreign banks to be more strict than the home country
supervisor.

The last observation is due to Kowalski et al. (2004), who present the results of an
interview study with local managers of foreign banks in Croatia, Estonia, and Poland,
referring to the strictness and quality of supervisors. One striking result is that Estonia
scores very high on the supervisor’s professionalism and lack of arbitrariness relative to
the scores for Croatia and Poland. When the question also refers to how knowledgeable
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the supervisors are, the scores for all the three countries 11 are less impressive. Most
striking is that the Estonian supervisor clearly is perceived as imposing more binding
requirements than the home country supervisor. This result may stem from the relatively
high capital requirements in Estonia. While most Western European countries impose an
8 percent requirement, Estonia requires banks to hold 10 percent.

Summarizing our study of Estonia it is clear that monetary policy has been almost
completely outsourced while banking supervision has only been partially outsourced
although the banking system is controlled almost completely by foreign banks. The CB
arrangement for monetary policy has been very successful and contributed to a relatively
rapid quality enhancement of the banking sector. The lack of LOLR activity by the BOE
increased the need for quality in banking and this need could be satisfied most efficiently
through FDI in banking.

The BOE has imposed relatively strict capital requirements on the foreign controlled
banks and retained substantial supervisory authority in cooperation with home country
supervisors. This policy is consistent with the organization of foreign owned banks as
subsidiaries as discussed in Section II. The strictness may reflect a rational fear that
foreign supervisors may allow a distressed foreign parent bank to shift losses to the
Estonian subsidiary. A lack of confidence in its own supervisory capability may
contribute to the strictness as well.

Allowing the foreign banks to operate as branches would have enabled Estonia to
outsource supervision more completely. The costs of imposing stricter requirements than
home country supervisors would then have been unnecessary.

11

On a scale of 1-5 where 5 represents lack of knowledge and professionalism. Estonia scores 2.3, while
Poland and Croatia score 2.5.
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V Currency Board and Banking Supervision in Argentina
The Argentinean CB dates back to 1991 when Carlos Menem introduced the
convertibility plan after being elected President in 1989. The exchange rate relative to the
USD was set at 1=1. The CB was abandoned in January 2002. The Argentinean Peso
sank rapidly to 3 to USD 1. A number of banks were in distress at this time.

Exhibit 5
GDP growth in Argentina
1995 – 2004 GDP Growth Rate For Argentina

In hindsight there are a number of factors that contribute to the explanation of the failure
of the CB. These factors illustrate the conditions for outsourcing of central banking and
the important differences between Estonia and Argentina.

Unlike Estonia, Argentina is not a very open economy. International trade accounts for
about 10 percent of GDP—less than in the USA. In spite of liberalization efforts and
reforms during the 90s, the labor market and wage adjustments remained sluggish. 12
In general, liberalization efforts were de facto less impressive than on paper. The failure
to rein in public sector spending may have contributed to the lack of liberalization and the

12

See Willett (2003)
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weakening of the CB. Argentina did not follow the rules that make the CB viable and
credible. Openness and a general liberal economic environment are among these rules.
Furthermore, the CB was seriously corrupted by the central Argentine government. The
permission (explicit and implicit) granted the state governments to issue IOU´s which
looked and felt like money were significant mechanisms for circumventing the CB´s
basic requirement: no issuance of money. The central government that could not issue
money or monetize debt, was allowing its states to do just that, which destroyed the letter
and the spirit of the CB and, therefore, the confidence of international and domestic
investors. The net results were a run on the banks in 2001, and a huge array of restrictions
by the central government to stem the tide.

It can be argued that the dollar was not a natural choice of currency for building the CB
around it. The USA is not the major trading partner of Argentina. When the dollar
appreciated strongly in the late 90s, Argentina’s peso was appreciating relative to
currencies of major trading partners. The substantial depreciation of the currency of a
major trading partner and competitor, Brazil, may be considered an element of bad luck
and it contributed to the Argentinian economic calamity.

The Argentinian banking system was in shambles as well in 2001 when the debt crisis hit.
Only a year or two years earlier, the reforms in 1995 of supervision, deposit insurance
and bank failure resolution were considered highly successful. 13 The reforms were
expected to reduce risk-taking incentives and reduce costs of banking crises if they
occurred. The strains on the system in 2001 were overwhelming and systemic, however.

The banking system was not foreign controlled to the degree we have seen in Eastern
Europe. Less than 25 percent of the banking sector was controlled by foreign bank
subsidiaries and the largest domestic bank was state-owned.. Accordingly foreign
supervision was not extensive. One reason for the modest foreign presence may have
been the less friendly FDI climate as compared to Eastern Europe. The foreign banks also
specialize on the corporate sector and mortgages, while consumer banking is left to
13

See de la Torre (1999).
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domestic banks. In Eastern Europe, the subsidiaries of foreign banks are like local banks
with foreign ownership.

V.2. A brief review of the 1990s
In 1991 the Peso exchange rate relative to the USD was set at 1=1 when the CB
arrangement was initiated. Exhibit 6 shows that the CB was very successful in terms of
inflation control. The inflation rate fell rapidly during the first CB-years and it went
below the US rate in 1996 and remained below. The decline in inflation was not
sufficient to avert a real appreciation of the Peso. Although the inflation came down
below the US rate, the difference was insufficient to compensate for the early real
appreciation. According to many estimates the overvaluation of the Peso when the crisis
hit was around 20 percent.
Exhibit 6. Inflation rates in USA and Argentina

% change in CPI to
previous

30,0
25,0
20,0
Argentina
USA

15,0
10,0
5,0
0,0
-5,0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year

The CB fixes the nominal exchange rates. It leaves real rates subject to trade patterns, to
conditions in the forex markets and to inflation patterns. Clearly, as Exhibit 7 shows, the
terms of trade were moving in favor of the US and Argentinian exports (predominantly
not with the US) were becoming much less competitive as the dollar was a strong
currency almost throughout the CB period. Argentina, which was heavily indebted, and
its ability to generate foreign exchange reserves critically dependent on investor
confidence and its capacity to export found itself in a non- competitive international
position, which contributed to the spiral downward toward a major crisis in 2000-2001.
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-We must add that Argentina´s fiscal management was reckless. All of its governments
have borrowed themselves into a fiscal crisis. Some of the borrowing was used for
political patronage and appeasement, in some cases simply to increase wages before
elections. Exhibit 8 shows the uneven discipline in fiscal policy even when it was
absolutely required (and expected by the market) during the CB period. The figures do
not include regional and local governments.
- Aggravating the problems were the Tequila effects from Mexico in 1995 (partially
mitigated by assistance from the IMF), and the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 19981999, and the overvaluation of the Argentinian Peso became a source of the Argentinian
economic tragedy. The Brazilian effects were also felt in the bond markets as the risk
premium on Brazilian bonds widened putting further pressures on Argentinian debt
service and new debt costs.
Exhibit 7
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Exhibit 8
Argentina’s Government spending, Deficit and GDP

Millions
Government
Consumption
Fiscal Balance
GDP

1991
-

1992

1993

1994

-

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

31953 33948 34446 34023 35325 37353 38918 39298
-963
-73 -1574 -1886 -1426 -5234 -4357 -4148 -8126 -6818
181000 227000 237000 257000 258000 272000 293000 299000 283000 284000
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Deficit in % GDP

-0.5 -0.003

-0.7

-0.7

-0.6

-1.9

-1.5

-1.4

-2.9

V3. Resolving banking Crises in the 1990´s- Argentine Style
The recent history of the resolutions of bank failures in Argentina were reviewed by de la
Torre (1999) and Fanelli

The shocks of the 1990´s were fundamentally externally generated. There are two: the
Tequila shock in 1995 and the South East Asia shock of 1997 followed by the Russian
shock. The only system in place prior to the crises was embodied in judicial liquidation:
bank failure making deposits illiquid and value impaired.

Bank failures had to be dealt swiftly (the immediacy `clause´-implicit in a CB
arrangement) as the government was unable to delay resolution because it lacked
liquidity provided by the Central Bank. Adding to the pressure for immediate resolution
is the desire to limit, if not eliminate contagion effects.

The elements of the bank bailout plan for Argentina were:
1- Reforms of financial institutions- 1995. This consisted of carving out
privileged liabilities (e.g. owed wages) from the liabilities side of a `bad
bank´, and carving out good assets on the asset side and transferring the
balance of the asset and the liabilities to a bank in good standing (the `good´
bank). The bad bank ends up with the bad liabilities and the impaired assets
and will then have to be liquidated. Good assets and good liabilities are rank
ordered to maximize the protection of depositors and the minimize the effects
of failure on non-impaired bank assets. A broader objective is the
minimization of moral hazard based on lessons learned from past rescue
efforts.
2- Deposit insurance- SEDESA (sistema de Seguro de Garantia de los depositos
bancarios) through mandatory contributions paid by the banking system. The
size of the contribution was a function of the riskiness of the banking
institution. The insurance plan did not need to wait until the institution was in
jeopardy of real failure. Banks were allowed to enter rehabilitation plans, and
assistance was made available to banks acquiring assets and liabilities of
banks in rehabilitation, or acquiring institutions that are in rehabilitation.
3- The Bank Capitalization Trust Fund. The fund was capitalized by
international agencies and special bond issues and was able to inject funds
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-2.4

directly (including making loans convertible into equity and buying illiquid
assets of distressed financial entities) in the financial system in the event of a
crisis. This is equivalent, except of how it is financed) to the Resolution Trust
Corporation that resolved the S&L crisis in the US. All the options available
were intended to stop banks from becoming bad banks.
Between 1995 and 1998, 18 bank failures were resolved. All the deposits were covered
by the guarantee in 16 of the 18 bank failure cases. Recently a new mechanism (for
Argentina), very familiar and effective in other countries, was added. It consisted of
securitization of salvageable assets of failed banks. The introduction of this technique
was enhanced by the presence of the CB.

The Argentinian experience was produced largely by the lack of discipline in fiscal and
monetary matters. Bad politics were driving out good economics undermining any
economic plan, including the CB set up. The lack of sufficient FDI in the banking sector,
especially form countries that have distinguished themselves in the management of their
economies and in the supervision of their banks, and the lack of economic liberalism at
almost all levels preempted the complete outsourcing of the monetary policy function and
most assuredly the supervisory function.

VI. Lessons for out-sourcing of central bank functions

Outsourcing the entire central banking within a CB framework is indeed an option
because of the presumed full separation between monetary and fiscal policy. We can,
therefore, argue that a CB framework combined with a an open economy with
unrestricted ownership of domestic banking institutions by foreign entities (subject to
their home country regulatory structure) necessitate a discussion of the viability of the
remaining roles of a central bank in a host country like Estonia.

The outsourcing decision clearly has its advocates and is largely driven by timing and the
political process. We now consider its advantages and its disadvantages in general cases:
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Advantages
Absence of political
Considerations which can
corrupt the supervisory function
and the resolution method and
size of the rescue package

Disadvantages
Absence of political considerations
because supervision and
rescue packages have strong
political consequences

The problem of supervision becomes
More serious as failure has immediate
fiscal consequences that are not
easily fungible in a CB framework with
monetary policy on auto pilot.
Forbearance and other gimmicks will not
Be useful, if indeed they are available.

Immediacy, if not urgency of
settling bank failures promptly
Costs of bank failures can be shifted
to the banks through an insurance scheme
that protects depositors. The CB structure
in no way hinders that
The resolution of bank failures could

In the event of failure Central
bankers need to have the basic skills
and info.

Be achieved by setting up
in Argentina a trust mirroring the
Resolution Trust Fund in the US.
The Central bank need not be directly
Involved.

to make sure that the public
Interest is protected,
especially from a moral
hazard resulting from foreign banks
owning Estonian banking
institutions in the form of
subsidiaries that are supervised and
potentially regulated by both the
home (concerned about the health of
their banking institutions on a
consolidated worldwide basis) and
host country central bank, while the
mother institution is regulated only
by the home country central bank.
The incentive, should difficulties
develop, is to shift the bad assets to
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the subsidiary in Estonia so that the
host country taxpayers pay for the
bank failure. This is more likely to
occur should the supervisory
function be farmed out to any other
central bank, especially that of the
home country.
The problem in the case of Estonia is that the subsidiary could account for a large portion
[if not the entire] of the banking system, while constituting a small portion of the home
country banking institutions´ assets. This asymmetry will insure an equivalent
asymmetry in the need to regulate foreign banking institutions operating in smaller
countries, but this is so regardless of whether the CB is operating or not. The protection
of the national interest through the preservation of the bank (financial system) in a
country like Estonia will be more compelling than keeping the subsidiary operating either
from its owner perspective or from the home country regulator´s perspective. This clearly
argues against a strategy of out-sourcing of supervisory powers. The issue is further
compounded by the fact that a foreign bank may experience multiple problems in many
of its foreign subsidiaries. Fixing the problems in the Estonian subsidiary may well not
be on the top of the agenda for the home bank, but definitely critical to the Estonian
banking system.

The issue of transaction costs attached to bank failure resolution is also an important
consideration. Not having a structure and a well trained staff to deal with domestic
banking failures or problems may well turn a problem crisis into a crisis and invite a
systemic failure. Third parties managing the supervisory and rescue functions may well
have neither the heart not the commitment to see that things are done in the long term
interest of the country. Their suggestions may well be standard ones void of domestic
considerations a la IMF in the standard package it suggests to solve macro economic
problems in debtor countries. Furthermore, the home country regulators need someone to
talk to and coordinate with in the host country.

This argues against the outsourcing option. However, a committee of financial
coordination and enforcement could be set up to protect the interest of the host country,
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and banks operating in Estonia could be required to set up branches instead of
subsidiaries that are supervised by the home country´s central bank and which deposits
are guaranteed by the home country´s central bank or insurance program. All transactions
in the branch will be supported by the full capital of the home bank. The problem is that
the home bank may well refuse to participate in a market where they do not have a choice
in the organizational form.

A home country supervisor working with he right incentives relative to foreign branches
would presumably set up host country offices where local expertise is gathered. This
expertise would then be available in a crisis and contribute to the protection of host
country interests.

VII Conclusions and lessons for regional integration
The outsourcing of important policy functions by any government requires a degree of
convergence of policy objectives and values.
The necessary conditions for the implementation of an outsourcing strategy are:
1- Trust in the capability and honesty of foreign supervisors and policy makers
2- Firmness of policies and plans of the host country
3- Stability and focus of the political process in host country
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4- Degree of openness of the economy and the degree of foreign ownership of
banks
5- The degree to which a country is engaged in international trade
6- The level of coordination between home and host country
7- The consistency and clarity of signals form the country seeking to outsource
8- The level of nationalism in the country. The extreme version of nationalism
may preempt any outsourcing regardless of how promising it may be.
National interest becomes skewed in directions that are not determined by
economic rationality.
9- The degree of transparency in public policy and the credibility of the political
leadership.
The comparison between Estonia and Argentina highlights the role of openness to trade,
capital flows, and a generally liberal policy regime.
One form of outsourcing is to participate in integrated regions wherein authority is given
to a super-national authority. This is an argument similar to an optimal currency area that
is at the foundation of replacing 13 currencies with one called the euro. Just as these
currencies were replaced so could the supervisory functions of their central banks by one
agency with the resources necessary to do the job with nationals providing the necessary
sensitivities in the local markets.
Outsourcing to such an authority may be politically more acceptable than outsourcing to
another country’s. The economic considerations and general requirements for successful
outsourcing are the same, however.

Burden sharing in crises
Opennness
Flexibility
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Appendix 1
LIST OR CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION
(BIS)
Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision
1. An effective system of banking supervision must have clear responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved.
Each agency should possess operational independence and adequate resources. A suitable legal framework for banking
supervision is also necessary.
Licensing and Structure
2. The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks must be clearly defined.
3. The licensing authority must have the right to set criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet
the standard set (ownership structure, management structure, operating plan, internal controls and a projected financial
condition including the capital base, as a minimum)
4. Banking supervisors must have the authority to review and reject any proposal to transfer significant ownership or
controlling interests in existing banks to other parities.
5. Banking supervisors must have the authority to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or investments by
a bank, and ensuring that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder
supervision.
Prudential Regulations and Requirements
6. Banking supervisors must set appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements that should reflect the risks the
bank undertakes and must define the components of capital, bearing in mind their ability to absorb losses.
7. The evaluation of a bank’s policies, practices and procedures related to the granting of loans and the ongoing
management of the loan and investment portfolios, is an essential part of any supervisory system.
8. Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks establish and adhere to adequate policies, practices and procedures
for evaluating the quality of assets and the adequacy of loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves.
9. Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have management information systems to identify concentrations
within the portfolio. Supervisors must set prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single borrowers or groups of
related borrowers.
10. Banking supervisors must have the requirements that banks lend to related companies or individuals, on an arm’slength basis, in order to prevent abuses arising from connected lending.
11. Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and procedures for identifying, monitoring
and controlling country risk and for maintaining appropriate reserves against such risks.
12. Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have systems that accurately measure, monitor and control market
risks. Supervisors should have the authority to impose specific limits and/or specific capital charges on market risk
exposures, if warranted.
13. Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a comprehensive management process (including appropriate
board and senior management oversight) to identify, measure, monitor and control all other material risks.
14. Banking supervisors determine that banks have internal controls adequate with the nature and scale of the business
(these should include clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility, establishment of functions and
appropriate independent internal or external audit to test adherence to controls as well as applicable laws and
regulations).
15. Banking supervisors must determine that banks have established adequate policies, practices and procedures that
promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank from being used,
intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements.
Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision
16. An effective banking system should consist of some form of both on-site and off-site supervision.
17. Banking supervisors must have regular contact with bank management through understanding of the institution
operations.
18. Banking supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analyzing prudential reports and statistical
returns from banks on a solo and consolidated basis.
19. Banking supervisors must have a means of conducting independent validations of supervisory information either
through on-site examinations or use of external auditors.
20. An essential element of banking supervision is the ability of the supervisors to monitor the banking groups on a
consolidated basis.
Information requirements
21. Banking supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance with
consistent accounting policies and practices that enable the supervisor to obtain a fair view of the financial condition of
the bank and the profitability of its business.
Formal powers of supervisors
22. Banking supervisors must have adequate supervisory measures to bring out timely corrective actions when banks
fail to meet prudential requirements when there are regulatory violations. In extreme circumstances, this should include
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the ability to revoke the banking license or recommend its revocation.
Cross-border Banking
23. Banking supervisors must practice consolidated monitoring over their international active banking organizations
and apply appropriate prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banking organizations.
24. A key component of consolidated supervision is establishing contact and information exchange with other
supervisors involved, primarily with host authorities.
25. Banking supervisors must call for the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same high standards
as required of domestic institutions and must have the authority to share information needed by the home country of the
supervisors of those banks, for the purpose of carrying out consolidated supervision.
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